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Précis 
China’s Fifth Generation Filmmakers1 brought forth a burst of transformative cinema, but 
it could not be done without the strong historical antecedents of cultural turmoil and official 
censorship steered by the singular political course of the Chinese Communist Party.  This group 
of filmmakers, particularly Chen Kaige (b. 1952), Tian Zhuangzhuang (b. 1952), and Zhang 
Yimou (b. 1951), produced a national cinema that was defined by censorship.   It became their 
dilemma to define a course within the confines of censorship that not only absorbed the duality 
of censorship, which serves to both condemn and to promote, but also defied and altered that 
course to serve their own purposes.  Their films became experiments at resolving this dilemma.  
Each filmmaker focused on his own unique way of recanting censorship boundaries, but together 
they brought Chinese cinema to the forefront of world attention.  Unfortunately, this legacy 
served to entrap them in a self-censorship of expectations.  They have found it difficult to 
progress beyond their own achievements as they continue to face a double standard of censorship 
both by their government and by national critics who decry their work as biased by Orientalism 
and Westernization.   Their circumscription by censorship is complete and unprecedented. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 The phrase “Fifth Generation Filmmakers” refers to the group of filmmakers who all graduated from Beijing Film 
Academy in 1982.  They were the first group of filmmakers to graduate since the end of the Cultural Revolution in 
1976 and are noted for their ability to challenge traditional ways of producing narratives on the big screen. 
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Bibliographical Essay 
China’s Fifth Generation filmmakers have achieved an iconic stature in their own nation 
as well as in the West based upon their initial 1990s offerings as purveyors of a new form of 
dissent against their closed society.  Initially their “emergence” was captured in journal articles 
centering on film criticism as the relative novelty of their type of quality film opened the 
international vision to Chinese film and its associated historiography.  However, the “New 
Cinema” of the Fifth Generation filmmakers, particularly Chen Kaige, Tian Zhuangzhuang, and 
Zhang Yimou, has become the focus of intensive study as a direct result of films, banned in their 
own country, attaining major success in the international film festivals.  Add the post-socialist 
“opening” of China in recent decades to the mix, and these works of the Fifth Generation 
filmmakers have become virtual icons.  Their vision of China has become accepted as 
mainstream representations of the period, and actual texts centering specifically on this handful 
of films are studied in universities.  The volume of university press books and specific 
film/history books has grown exponentially over time as both East Asian studies and film studies 
have exploded as fields of formal study.  The enormous amount of material available now on the 
Fifth Generation filmmakers has served as a double-edged sword—the ordeal of becoming a 
living legend is that the artist must constantly work against an often inflated image of self. 
A basic understanding of the history of the span of the Maoist years (pre- and post-) is 
provided in the textbook, Revolution and Its Past by R. Keith Schoppa (Pearson Prentice 
Hall, 2006).  Schoppa covers a great deal of ground in a compressed space in his treatment of the 
People’s Republic of China, providing a strong introduction to the central facts that propelled 
modern Chinese history forward.  The compressed format of this textbook does not prevent it 
from giving full scope to the timeframes it describes.  Honing in on the distinct nature of Chinese 
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Communism, Franz Michael’s Mao and the Perpetual Revolution ( Barron’s, 1977) is also a 
fundamental read as it gives a detailed comparison of the Marxist-Leninist brand of communism 
with what would come to be known as Maoism.  Although it is more limited in its scope, a 
timeline playing the rise of Soviet communism contrasted against Chinese communism is a good 
reference tool as well as some primary source documents contained in the appendix.  
 In order to fully understand the impact of censorship on the Fifth Generation filmmakers, 
it is critical to understand how the Chinese have viewed media in the past.  In A History of the 
Press and Public Opinion in China by Lin Yutang (Greenwood Press, 1968) censorship is 
traced from Ancient China to contemporary times.  While the focus of this book is on literary 
and journalistic censorship, it is an invaluable resource as it provides excellent details and 
statistics pertinent to its topic.   Geremie R. Barmé and John Minford’s Seeds of Fire:  
Chinese Voices of Conscience (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1988) is structured much like a 
scrapbook in that each chapter consists of selections from various Chinese voices, such as 
novelists, political prisoners, poets, organized around a particular subject.  The section on Yellow 
Earth was particularly excellent.  After a brief synopsis of the plot, the chapter presented quotes 
as arguments for and against the new art form.  This lively cogent exchange was extremely 
readable and provided a thorough and thoughtful examination of some of the reasons why critics 
disapproved of the Fifth Generation filmmakers. Further chapters include discussions revolving 
around dissent and the Cultural Revolution.  Each element makes careful use of popular 
selections, such as the use of the invented word “Urbling” that defined the “educated youth” who 
were to become the Fifth Generation filmmakers.   
In order to understand more fully how the arts were viewed during the formative years of 
the Fifth Generation filmmakers, it is necessary to understand what role the arts were supposed 
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to play in Maoist society.  Problems of Art and Literature by Mao Tse-Tong (International 
Publishers, 1950) is the primary document that encapsulates Mao’s direct words on the matter.  
Mao instructs artists regarding the four categories of the masses that art should serve.  The 
importance of the role of Mao’s wife in suppressing the arts, specifically film, during the 
Cultural Revolution, as well as her creation of the revolutionary ballets, is thoroughly revealed in 
Comrade Chiang Ch’ing by Roxanne Witke (Little, Brown and Company, 1977).    
Having laid out the foundation for study of the background against which the Fifth 
Generation filmmakers arose, a similar groundwork is laid for Chinese cinema studies with two 
books that both are dated but contain unique perspectives on narrow time bands of motion 
picture history.  The first of these books is Dianying:  An Account of Films and the Film 
Audience in China by Jay Leyda (The Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1972).  This 
volume follows the history of cinema in China from the first showing of a Lumiere film in 
Shanghai in 1896 through to 1967.  The value of reviewing this book is the depiction of the pre-
Cultural Revolution film industry and a chilling report by a Soviet observer on the complete 
shut-down of the movie studios in 1966.  Another intriguing aspect that this early book provides 
is the notion of films about minority nationalities in China, something that the Fifth Generation 
filmmakers centered on in their dissent.  Chinese Film:  The State of the Art in the People’s 
Republic, edited by George Stephen Semsel ( Praeger, 1987) is a classic work that provides a 
detailed report on how the Chinese film studios and distribution channels were set up.  It also 
firmly placed Chinese film strongly in the field of political activism well before the People’s 
Republic of China.  A solid discussion of the early films of the Fifth Generation filmmakers, 
centering particularly on The Yellow Earth, serves as a solid introduction to the characteristics to 
be found within these films. It is interesting that in both of these books, both authors note that 
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they are restricted in their ability to grasp the depth of the field due to their inability to read 
and/or speak not only Mandarin but Cantonese and the many other languages of mainland China.  
This basic language barrier remains a restriction on research and self-censorship since only 
translated materials can be used. 
Parallels to Soviet communist cinema are worth noting, especially in light of the concept 
of censorship.  In Cinema & Soviet Society, 1917-1953 by Peter Kenez (Cambridge 
University Press, 1992), the notion that communism alone imposes censorship is dispelled.  A 
full section devoted to censorship also recounts the personality idolatry around Stalin akin to that 
around Mao.  The aspects of how national cinema was handled during major transitions within 
the Soviet Communist Party can also be gleaned.  
The roots of the Fifth Generation filmmakers are captured not only in the interviews that 
have been given by each of the directors involved since the 1990s but also in Memoirs from the 
Beijing Film Academy:  The Genesis of China’s Fifth Generation by Ni Zhen (Duke 
University Press, 2002).  This critical resource, written by their teacher, provides the ultimate 
“insider” look at how the Chinese film industry operated showcasing the background and 
specific philosophies and talents of each director.  It changed the state of the field by affording 
non-Chinese researchers the opportunity to hear directly from someone so deeply connected not 
only professionally to the Chinese film industry himself but also personally as teacher of this 
group, providing unparallel accessibility into their origins. It also offers a look at other Fifth 
Generation filmmakers who have not “translated” to international recognition.  The postscript of 
this book addresses the controversial comments that have come to be hurled against the Fifth 
Generation filmmakers including accusations of both post-colonialism and Eurocentrism 
entering into their works.  It is the author’s viewpoint that neither of these issues informs the 
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“classic” films of the Fifth Generation filmmakers.  In fact, controversy has followed the 
footsteps of the Fifth Generation directors as and the “opening” of the Chinese economy and 
society, seems to have diminished the power of their current work—film that does not seem to 
incorporate the aspects of dissent seen earlier.  While it must be remembered that the “classic” 
films such as The Blue Kite have never even been seen in China, could it be that censorship 
actually served to promote their films?  Has the spirit of non-cooperation died due to commercial 
success abroad?  Did the filmmakers cave in to Westernization, enjoying commercialization and 
international horizons more than catering to national interests? 
  Addressing all criticisms directly, Zhang Yimou in Zhang Yimou: Interviews edited 
by Frances Gateward (University of Mississippi, 2001) speaks directly to the central debates 
surrounding the early works of his generation of filmmakers, specifically censorship and 
Orientalism.  King of the Children & The New Chinese Cinema by Chen Kaige, Wan Zhi, 
and Tony Rayns (Faber and Faber, 1989) also provides an opportunity to hear directly from 
the director about one of his films. 
There are many actual film critiques of the Fifth Generation classic films of the late 
80s/early 90s.  An excellent primary source, Speaking in Images by Michael Berry (Columbia 
University Press, 2005) presents interviews with modern Chinese filmmakers.  This volume 
focuses on the distinction among the three bases of Chinese cinema—Mainland China, Taiwan, 
and Hong Kong.  Discussions of the controversies that each director has had to deal with provide 
solid information.  Hearing directly the frustration of Zhang Yimou on the subject of his critics 
verified the dilemma of the Fifth Generation filmmakers.  The pre-eminent authority on Chinese 
cinema, Chris Berry, has written several penetrating collections of essays on various topics such 
as Postsocialist Cinema in Post-Mao China:  The Cultural Revolution after the Cultural 
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Revolution (Routledge, 2004) and with Mary Farquhar, China on Screen:  Cinema and 
Nation (Columbia University Press, 2006).  In this latter volume, an excellent timeline is 
presented with side-by-side columns comparing general history versus cinema history.  
However, the real value here is in a chapter titled “Time and the National” wherein the whole 
concept of historiology is defined and shown against the context of Fifth Generation films such 
as The Yellow Earth and Red Sorghum.  Another excellent recent book is Reinventing China:  
A Generation and Its Films by Paul Clark (The Chinese University Press, 2005) which 
devotes its whole content to the Fifth Generation, concentrating on descriptions of the people 
behind the art and the films themselves, including some of the little-known Fifth Generation 
directors.  It does not discuss audience reaction to the films in any detail.  New Chinese 
Cinemas:  Forms, Identities, Politics edited by Nick Browne, Paul G. Pickowicz, Vivian 
Sobchack, and Esther Yau.  (Cambridge University Press, 1994) brings together seasoned 
Chinese film authorities to explore the interplay of Communist ideology with their national 
cinema.  The impact of the 1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre on the Chinese film industry and 
its subsequent effect on the perception of the Fifth Generation filmmakers provided an important 
perspective.     
Criticism of Chinese film by the Chinese themselves has started to make its way to the 
West.   Some of this criticism is startling to Western readers who have definitely acquired a 
certain socio-political acceptance of their own perspective on another nation’s history by 
accepting such films as To Live and The Blue Kite as accurate depictions of Chinese life.   China 
Pop:  How Soap Operas, Tabloids, and Bestsellers Are Transforming a Culture by Jianying 
Zha (The New Press, 1995) affords another intimate look at Chen Kaige but adds some 
refreshingly new context in terms of a perceived competition with Zhang Yimou.  The fickle role 
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of the censorship of Chen Kaige’s film, Farewell My Concubine, and the lack of respect shown 
by current Chinese media for such pre-eminent directors are elements presented in the book.    
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Introduction 
 This paper will examine the influence of censorship on a specific group of Chinese 
filmmakers known as the Fifth Generation, and the dilemma it has created for these artists. 
Media in China has always been subject to censorship as it has always been recognized as a 
powerful influence.  By surveying the role of censorship over a historical timeline from ancient 
times to the present, it can be seen how each political unit handled their authority over this tool.  
Focusing on the modern era, the evolution of censorship has caused many changes to literature 
and the arts.  A detailed analysis is made of modes of resistance—aesthetic, historical, and 
cultural—used within three prominent Fifth Generation films to demonstrate their manipulation 
of censorship. 
Ancient Antecedents 
 “Chinese cinema has always had a strong political orientation.”2  This path was the direct 
result of the traditions of Chinese history which have long included censorship as an integral part 
of political culture.  As early as the reign of the first Emperor of Qin in the second century B.C., 
the government permitted the burning of books that it found objectionable and allowed the 
persecution of authors.3  Yet, “Chinese political theory admitted the necessity of someone 
responsible for the criticism of the government and even of the Emperor himself…”4  Therefore, 
in a government system unique to China, there were official imperial censors who served in a 
                                                 
2
 Ma Ning quoted in Chinese Film: The State of the Art in the People’s Republic, ed. George Stephen Semsel (New 
York, Connecticut, & London: Praeger, 1987), 63. 
3
 In 213 B.C., the Chancellor of the state of Qin, Li Si, ordered the burning of historical records and literature that 
were not written by Qin historians.  He also mandated that only the state should produce political books.  When 
scholars, many of whom were Confucian, protested, 460 of them were ordered buried alive.  In 1772, the Manchu 
Emperor Qianlong commenced the compilation of the Siku Quanshu (Complete Library of Four Treasurers) with the 
ambition of cataloging and preserving the best manuscripts in his empire.  Instead, Qianlong ended up becoming 
increasingly focused on eradicating anti-Manchuism from the literary record and ordered the destruction of over 
150,000 volumes.  This was a completely different mission than he had intended at the onset. Yutang Lin, A History 
of the Press and Public Opinion in China (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968), 167.   
4
 ibid, 6 & 7. 
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symbiotic relationship with the emperor—a type of moral compass that could be a source of 
good or evil depending on the political climate and personalities of the day.5   And while “…the 
common people thought very little about current politics…” there was a rich tradition of 
unofficial public censorship wherein scholars took on a very visible and active role in “beating 
the drum” in front of palace gates as powerful and successful mass movements.6  Overall, the 
attitude towards censorship could be summed up in a quote by Confucius:  “The people may be 
allowed to act, but may not be allowed to know.”7   
Censorship Discovers Cinema 
Early Chinese cinema of the 1920s followed the Hollywood formula of using popular 
themes and storylines that had become internationally pervasive.   These were the heady days of 
pre-Hays Code U. S. cinema.8   Changes that swept post WWI Western societies created a whole 
new standard of social freedom and sexual mores where everything was “modernized.”   Chinese 
cinema and society, in general, followed this lead.  The influence of film brought about the idea 
that “[a]nything foreign is modern, whether it be a social usage or a style of dress.”9  
The Nationalist state was cognizant of the popular power that cinema possessed.   The 
Nanjing government began to wage its censorship campaign when the first Chinese sound film 
was made in 1931.10  As a central component of their official policy, Mandarin Chinese (guoyu—
the “national language”), became the spoken language used in film.  Use of dialects was 
restricted.  The central Nanjing government believed that the use of local dialect promoted 
                                                 
5
 ibid. 
6
 ibid, 7 & 8. 
7Originally in The Analects by Confucius, Book 8, Verse 9. ibid, 3. 
8
 The Hays Code took effect in the United States in 1934, but was originally thought up in 1930.  It was abandoned 
in 1968 with the birth of the rating system we presently in the United States.  
9
 B.Y. Lee, “Modernists and Anti-Modernists in China,” China Weekly Review, May 26, 1934: 498. 
10
 The first Chinese sound film was entitled Sing-Song Red Peony and was directed by Zhang Shichuan.  Chris Berry 
and Mary Farquhar, China On Screen: Cinema and Nation (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 52. 
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regional separatism.11  This was a prominent factor in the political split between the central 
government authority in Nanjing and the opposing separatist government in Canton.  Not only 
did the southern and Cantonese studios not want to lose their economic markets in Hong Kong 
and in overseas Chinese communities, but neither did their local government want to lose its 
“…claim of  ‘regional uniqueness.’”12    When the Canton regime lost one of its key leaders, Hu 
Hanmin in 1935, the National Film Censorship Committee (NFCC), a central government 
organization, put their restrictions on dialects firmly into place.  However, enforcement of their 
limitations was not possible and Cantonese studios often just ignored them.13 
By the mid-1930s censorship was burgeoning under the Nationalist government across all 
areas.  Edgar Snow presented statistics that there were “2,500 political prisoners in the great 
prison at Nanking.”14  He further catalogued the repression North China:  110 suspensions of 
publications of various types, with over “…230 political prisoners, including many students, 
artists, teachers and writers…[In] 1934 arrests in this category…totaled over 800.”15  Beyond 
this, the Peiping Chronicle “…records that 149 books were banned on a list issued on December 
29, 1934.”16  Among these were “…many of the best works of contemporary Chinese 
writers…including 11 books by Lu Hsun, ‘father of the modern Chinese story’.”17  Communist 
writers were the targets of even more extreme censorship.  In 1931 five communist writers were 
executed as the Nationalists battled the increasing popularity that communism held for the 
young, and viciously sought to eradicate it.18    
                                                 
11
 Cinema and Urban Culture in Shanghai, ed. Yingjin Zhang (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), 184. 
12
 ibid, 184 & 185. 
13
 ibid, 187. 
14
 Lin, History of Press and Public Opinion, 172. 
15
 ibid, 173. 
16
 ibid. 
17
 ibid. 
18
 ibid. 
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The Nationalist government “…wanted modernity in China, but rejected its inherent 
foreignness.”19  So it attempted to suppress the rising liberalism with respect to social mores 
promoted by the film industry, censoring portrayals of progressive lifestyles that involved 
sensual clothing, kissing, or pre-marital cohabitation.20   The government was so intent on 
bringing scientific modernity to China that they waged an Anti-superstition Campaign.  This 
campaign censored any film dealing with religious subjects.  But it further extended the 
definition of “superstitious films” (shenguai dianying) to include anything “unscientific” such as 
martial art films (wuxia shenguai pian) or “strange” (guai) such as Alice in Wonderland or horror 
films like Frankenstein.21  The notion of banning such films was fortified by scholarly critics 
such as Mao Dun (1896-1981), who believed that they “…perpetuat[ed] feudal ideology and 
induc[ed] audiences to escape into a fantasy world rather than face their problems in reality.”22  
They warned against such “soft” films, claiming they “…anaesthetized the public instead of 
rousing its awareness, and…spread reactionary views under the pretext of entertainment.”23   On 
a more pragmatic basis, the banning of these magic/ghost movies was welcomed by the major 
studios because it diminished their competition with the smaller studios that produced such 
films.24 
Another institution arose at this time that served to re-channel the direction of Chinese 
cinema.  Luo Mingyou25 built an entirely new film company, Lianhua, in 1929 that was 
dedicated to “…the choice of contemporary themes, handled in a realistic fashion, which deeply 
                                                 
19
 Cinema in Shanghai, ed. Zhang, 193. 
20
 ibid. 
21
 ibid, 190. 
22
 ibid, 191. 
23
 “Kwok & M.C. Quiquemelle – Chinese Cinema and Realism,” in Film & Politics in the Third World, ed. John 
D.H. Downing (Brooklyn, NY: Autonomedia, 1987), 182. 
24
 Cinema in Shanghai, ed. Zhang, 191. 
25
 According to Kwok & Quiquemelle, in 1929 Luo Mingyou was a twenty-seven year old theater chain owner for 
the provinces of North China and Shanghai. 
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moved the public at the time, alert to subjects close to its own experience.”26   The fact that these 
realistic Chinese films “…could now rival foreign films on an artistic plane” provided the film 
industry with a new audience of young intellectuals who had hitherto dismissed their national 
cinema.27  Unfortunately, occupation of Manchuria and the many heavy Japanese attacks on such 
cities as Shenyang (1931) and Shanghai (1932) took a heavy toll on the film industry.  In 
Shanghai, “…where fighting raged for several weeks, part of the city was razed.”28  “…[T]hirty 
studios were destroyed and many small companies forced to close.  Out of a total of thirty-nine 
theaters, sixteen were in ruins, including most of the theaters specializing in Chinese films.”29 
Censorship Serves the State 
It was during this tumultuous time that the League of Left Writers reached out to the 
Communist Party to interest them in participating in the arts.  They reacted swiftly and strongly 
to this open invitation into the film arts in particular, seeing that “…the realistic current…sat 
perfectly with their program of struggle against feudalism and imperialism, via the denunciation 
of social ills and the awakening of national feelings.”30  With the advent of the Communist 
Party’s entrance into filmmaking, studios fell under the influence of the Soviet Union, and their 
film industry’s portrayal of social realism became the norm.  Many went to the USSR for 
training.   Here they saw the effects of the Stalinist view of the film industry, about which a 
conference in 1928 had proclaimed: “The feature film should become an instrument of 
communist education and agitation and weapon of the Party in the education and organization of 
the masses around the basic tasks in the period of building socialism…”31 
                                                 
26
 “Chinese Cinema,” in Film & Politics, ed. Downing, 182 & 183. 
27
 ibid. 
28
 ibid, 184. 
29
 ibid. 
30
 ibid. 
31
 Peter Kenez, Cinema and Soviet Society 1917-1953 (Santa Cruz, CA: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 104. 
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In the infancy of the Chinese Communist Party’s formation, Mao Zedong took the 
example of Soviet Communism seriously with respect to the issue of how the arts were to be 
handled.  Mao concurred with the Soviet Communist viewpoint and stated that “In order to 
overthrow a political power, it is always necessary to create public opinion, to do work in the 
ideological sphere.”32  The work of the Nationalists had pushed China towards the new and 
scientific by molding Chinese society into a pasteurized homogeny through censorship of the 
arts, and this aligned with Mao’s own ideas.  Among Mao’s early influences was the work of 
Chen Duxiu, a dean at Peking University, who endorsed “…a total break with China’s traditional 
past…and complete westernization…”33  Mao’s study of Chen Duxiu led him to the essays of Hu 
Shi who put forward the idea that Chinese writing should be broadened to break the 
“…monopoly of a scholarly elite, and to replace it by pai hua, the actual spoken language used 
by the people.”34  These views became the central basis for those of the Chinese Communist 
Party. 
But Mao further defined his own vision of the Problems of Art and Literature in his 
conference with writers and artists from across China in May 1942, in Yan’an.  Here he 
expounded his unique contribution to communism that unequivocally set the revolutionary 
purpose to “…first and foremost…get to know the people and to understand their ways.”35  This 
emphasis on the people as exemplars of richness and wisdom was a strong departure from the 
Leninists who “…assumed that there was nothing worthwhile in the peasant way of life and that 
their task was to persuade the peasants to change it.”36   In one brilliant, deft stroke, Mao exploits 
                                                 
32
 Franz Michael, An Illuminating Study of Mao Tse-tung’s Role in China and World Communism: Mao and the 
Perpetual Revolution, ed. I.E. Cadenhead Jr. (Woodbury, NY: Barron’s, 1977), 149. 
33
 ibid, 5. 
34
 ibid. 
35
 Mao Tse-tung, Problems of Art and Literature (New York: International Publishers, 1950), 11. 
36
 Kenez, Cinema and Soviet Society, 90. 
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the duality of censorship by saying that “…literature and art…must...serve…” the working class, 
peasantry, and armed forces.37  Furthermore, “…the masses are not able to appreciate theories if 
they are abstract.”38  The confluence of these two statements effectively “…conflate[s] author 
and audience, requiring that writers should always express the will of the masses.  Since the 
opinion of the masses would be ventriloquized by the state ideologues, the Party would thus be 
able to maintain absolute control.”39  Mao “…instated the Party as the only organ regulating the 
transmission of ideology…”40  He did this emphatically and yet injected the element of what he 
would later deem “revolutionary romanticism.”41 He would later state that “[n]ature provides the 
only source material for literature and art in their finished form.”42  In short, the use of cinema 
became “…a powerful cultural means for the legitimization of the new sociopolitical order 
established in 1949.”43 
With the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the Chinese film industry 
was nationalized and government film came to a virtual standstill, producing just one film in 
1951 and only four in 1952.44   The film industry was changing to incorporate the ideology of the 
Yan’an conference, superseding socialist realism with a “realism tinged with reformist ideas….in 
Chinese, called revolutionary realism.”45  The period of the 1950s and 1960s was “…a relatively 
                                                 
37
 Mao, Problems of Art and Literature, 18. 
38
 ibid, 12. 
39
 Yomi Braester, Witness Against History:  Literature, Film, and Public Discourse in Twentieth Century China 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), 115. 
40
 ibid, 22. 
41
 “Chinese Cinema,” in Film & Politics, ed. Downing, 191. 
42
 Mao, Problems of Art and Literature, 25. 
43
 New Chinese Cinemas: Forms, Identities, Politics, ed. Nick Browne, Paul G. Pickowicz, Vivian Sobchack, and 
Esther Yau (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 21. 
44
 “Chinese Cinema,” in Film & Politics, ed. Downing, 189. 
45
 ibid, 189 & 190. 
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flexible, less doctrinaire period…” in a film industry that was striving to attain the correct level 
of realism.46 
Censorship for the Masses 
Towards the end of 1963, Chinese censorship of the arts took on a whole new face—that 
of Jiang Qing.  Mao’s third wife, Jiang Qing (1914-1991) was a former minor actress who, in her 
own words, “…was not a brilliant actress,”47 but who had risen in the highly charged political 
and artistic center that was pre-revolutionary Shanghai.  She worked hard for her roles and 
reached the pinnacle of her acting career playing the leading role of Nora in Ibsen’s feminist 
drama, A Doll’s House.48  The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) did not approve of Mao’s 
interest in an actress but had permitted their marriage as inevitable.  However, it is commonly 
believed that they also added a proviso that restricted her from becoming involved in politics.  
Prior to the Cultural Revolution, little was publicly known of her. 
Jiang became fiercely resentful of the roles played by the wives of other top Party 
officials, such as Wang Guangmei and Deng Yingchao, who received recognition and public 
acknowledgement as their husbands’ partners.49  Seeking to establish a role for herself, in the 
mid-1960’s Jiang revived her interest in the arts and began a thorough study of the current film 
and theater offerings.  She proudly brought to Mao’s attention the fact that many films contained 
anti-Party sentiments, earning his attention.  Mao began to recognize that Jiang could be of use to 
him in the next chapter of history he wanted to write.  So he provided her with his support, 
approving her pronouncements, which were instrumental in dismissing many leading writers, 
actors, and film directors.  Total censorship reigned supreme: 
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In other countries a play or novel or story continues its public life long after its 
film adaptation has been condemned, preached against, or shelved, but in China 
official adverse criticism affects, retroactively, everyone and everything attached 
to the quarantined film.  An attack on a director or a film writer results in the 
withdrawal of all films and books signed by the offenders, from circulation and 
from history.50 
 
Mao had himself signaled the beginning of the Cultural Revolution with his famous swim 
in the Yangzi River in 1966.  Later Mao galvanized the start of the Cultural Revolution when he 
wrote a big-character poster with instructions to “Bombard the Headquarters.”  He authorized the 
Red Guard to be his “…vanguard in the class struggle.”  The youth of the Red Guard were 
electrified by the mission Mao had given them to undertake, and took up his call to destroy the 
four olds—ideas, habits, customs, and culture.   Jiang was an iconoclast and was proud of the 
work of “her” Red Guard as they destroyed books, temples, museums, and scholarly works.  The 
Red Guard also persecuted and tortured (often to death) intellectuals, scientists, and teachers.  
Both Mao and Jiang took the opportunity to rid themselves of enemies.  Mao concentrated on 
purging the Party leadership.  Both Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping were disposed of--one by 
death; the other by exile.51  Jiang also used the Cultural Revolution to take her revenge on 
personal enemies in her life and had no qualms about doing so.   
Revolutionary Arts 
Mao’s proclamation was her guidepost: “Revolutionary literature and art should create a 
variety of characters out of real life and help the masses to propel history forward.”52 Jiang’s 
quest was to instill all art forms with a social role.  “Make it revolutionary or ban it” was her 
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slogan.53   Cinema effectively stopped in China during the period of 1966 through 1970.  Instead, 
Jiang began to personally rewrite several major ballets, such as the Red Detachment of Women 
and White-Haired Girl, casting them in modern time, forming the basis for her “model operas”.  
These ballets were carefully modernized to remove non-revolutionary topics. In doing so, Jiang 
reformed dance by instructing ballerinas to perform men’s steps, breaking down the division in 
ballet over what gender did what type of dance.   Her model plays also provided strong leading 
roles for women. Furthermore, Jiang required all artistic productions to adhere to the “Principle 
of the Three Stresses”—“Of all the characters, stress the positive ones.  Of the positive 
characters, stress the heroic ones.  Of the main [heroic] characters, stress the central one.”54  
There were to be no “middle characters here to blur the lines, no irresolute endings to confuse 
and depress the audience.”55  This was totally in line with Mao’s proclamation in Yan'an against 
ambiguity.  By the mid-1970s, the eight model operas began to appear as feature film 
productions.56 
Critics thought that Jiang had gone too far in suppressing movies and considered the 
revolutionary operas boring in their dogmatism.  Jiang Qing’s former Shanghai art community 
was particularly critical of her actions and claimed that her political art for the masses was 
second-rate.  Some have even come to defend her work, such as Yang Chunxia, the main female 
actor in the opera The Azalea Mountain, who claims that these “…are still unsurpassed as 
monumental productions.”57  
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    The next two years found the violence of the Red Guard factions intensifying beyond 
the control of the Party.  Finally the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was called in to restrain the 
violence and the majority of the Red Guard youth were sent to the countryside to be re-educated 
by the peasants. Society found itself joining in the violence of the times, and families were 
destroyed, often forever, as members were variously sent to labor or re-education camps.  Jiang 
Qing was extremely active in gathering power to herself throughout the 10-year period of the 
Cultural Revolution.  She had associated herself with Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, and 
Yao Wenyuan, and they had become the “Gang of Four.”58  The four were called “the 
helicopters” by Deng Xiaoping because their rise was so abrupt from obscurity.59  Jiang Qing 
had finally earned her place at the pinnacle of power within the Party.  She truly believed that 
she would be capable of running the country as Mao’s successor.  However, while Mao 
continued to support Jiang, and it was certain that he did not want Deng Xiaoping take power, he 
appointed Hua Guofeng as acting premier.   This led to fierce infighting among the political 
factions.   
End of an Era 
When Mao died in 1976, Jiang Qing took her part in the mourning, leaving a wreath 
“from your student” for her husband.  Shortly afterwards, Hua Guofeng had the Gang of Four 
arrested.  This was relatively easy to do, because while the Gang of Four “dominated media and 
education,”60 they did not have good military support.  Although Mao was behind her, Jiang 
Qing had little support within the Party, and she had made many enemies during the purges of 
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the Cultural Revolution.  During their trial, all were found guilty and confessed, with the sole 
exception of Jiang Qing.61  The death sentences that were handed out were commuted to prison 
terms.   In 1991 Jiang was found dead, hanged in what authorities deemed to be a suicide. 
Most commentaries on the Gang of Four seem to agree that “there was no separate 
‘radical’ faction while Mao was alive; there was only Mao’s “high command.”62  Jiang Qing 
acted in perfect alignment with Mao’s thoughts and was used by Mao as a shield to further his 
own ideologies.  Perhaps, in the end, she was “purer” in her belief in those philosophies than 
even Mao, since she did not hesitate to act upon them.  New literature has attempted to position 
Jiang Qing differently in history, pointing out that she had to contend with “…slander piled 
on…[her character]…and deep-seated gender discrimination among Mao’s revolutionary 
comrades.”63  Those who came into power after Mao were more than willing to make her the 
whipping post for everything that occurred in the Cultural Revolution, and it has suited Western 
and current CCP interests to seek any diminution of Maoism.  As Jiang said at her trial, “What I 
did followed Mao’s line and the Party’s line.”64  The names of many officials in the then-current 
Deng Xiaoping government could be found on Party documents authorizing the acts of the 
Cultural Revolution, even that of the beloved Zhou Enlai.  Jiang put her role in history into 
perspective with her statement that “Everything I did, Mao told me to do.  I was his dog:  what 
he said to bite, I bit.”65  However, the irretrievable loss of so many lives and the misery endured 
by so many under her name during the Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution has rendered any 
further defense impossible.  
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Filmmakers of the Urbling Generation 
The Beijing Film Institute reopened in 1978.  “At the beginning, no one knew very well 
how the political situation would develop, and the reorganization of the studio took time.”66  
During this time, it is noted that two types of film genre came into play:  films inspired by the 
“literature of scars” (shan hen wenxue) and basic entertainment films.  The latter was important 
as “this type of film answered a real need in the public, wearied by the political rhetoric of the 
Cultural Revolution.”67    
  The distinctive concept of using the term “generations” has been coined to distinguish 
the waves of Chinese filmmakers.  This term denotes not only a historical time table of 
filmmakers but something far more profound, “…the mission of an era[,]…their moral concerns 
and their real effects on the future…”68  The strengths of these generations of Chinese 
filmmakers derive from the fact that they are basic socio-political units that share a common 
context but with individual creative responses and styles.  In 1978 the Fourth Generation, who 
had been denied an outlet for their art throughout the ten years of the Cultural Revolution, came 
back to the studios, not only to take up where they left off with their own artistic pursuits, but 
also to train a new generation of filmmakers.  Their students, the class of 1982, became known as 
the Fifth Generation filmmakers. 
  One of the chief characteristics of the Fifth Generation filmmakers is that they 
originated from what has been called the “Urbling” generation.  This invented word refers to the 
educated youth who grew up during the Cultural Revolution and took part in the often draconian 
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“up into the mountains and down to the countryside” program.69   This thoroughly novel plan 
shifted some four million youth from urban centers to be “re-educated” by the peasants in the 
rural wilderness of China in an effort not only to uphold Maoist ideology but to physically 
maintain control over an entire generation of youth.70  This experience served to disillusion many 
as they saw firsthand what national Chinese realities were, positioning their generation to 
become disenchanted with the distorted CCP line.71   
Born in 1952, Chen Kaige and Tian Zhuangzhuang were childhood friends and shared a 
common background in that their parents were involved in the arts and grew up in Beijing Film 
Studio housing, providing them with a basic creative environment.72  But, more importantly, they 
shared the trauma of having their homes and possessions ruthlessly ransacked and had to 
withstand seeing their parents subjected to public punishment as “members of the Black gang in 
literature and the arts” and forced to do supervised labor.73  Tian Zhuangzhuang’s parents were 
artists in the Communist base in Yan’an, but Chen Kaige’s father was less fortunate, coming 
from the Nationalist-controlled area. In the ugliness of the times, Chen Kaige found himself 
pushing and denouncing his own father at a struggle session.74 75  While Chen found himself sent 
to the forests of Xishuangbanna in Yunnan Province, Tian Zhuangzhuang went to a small village 
in northeast China on the Nen River.  These specific experiences in the rural areas helped to 
mold their future cinematic vision prompting “…[t]heir ambivalence toward the land and 
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primordial nature, and their determination to express it, [which] created a special visual style in 
Chinese cinema.76 
As the son of a former Nationalist army officer and a doctor, Zhang Yimou came from an 
entirely different background.   Growing up under the duress of his family’s classification, Zhang 
was sent down to the countryside in Shaanxi Province where he did hard labor hauling bales of 
cotton at the local mill.  However, he also found a niche for his artistic abilities in painting 
images of Chairman Mao on all the houses and offices in Beini Village and thus earning the 
respect of the local leadership.   Zhang realized that he wanted a life beyond the village, 
however, and scrupulously saved over several years to buy a Chinese Seagull brand camera, 
determined to teach himself landscape photography in the nearby mountains.77  When he finally 
submitted his photos in 1978 to the Beijing Film Academy, Zhang was already five years above 
the age threshold and could not take the enrollment exam.  A special letter from the Minister of 
Culture, Huang Zen, worked for and against Zhang as the Beijing Film Academy weighed their 
decision to accept this student.78  Zhang’s acceptance into the program sealed the promise of the 
class of 1982. 
The ambitions of this film class were definitive, and all the members joined together to 
further their particular philosophy.  As Chen Kaige stated: 
When we were at the Academy, we all shared the desire to develop film language.  That 
was a responsibility that our generation had to accept.  Our film language had to be 
different from previous Chinese cinema.  We had to completely eliminate falseness in 
film…We had to use a transformed language to tell history anew.79 
 
This moment in time, poised between the death of Mao in 1976 and the 1989 massacre at 
Tiananmen Square, was also serendipitous for their experimentation because the government 
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subsidized their filmmaking, allowing them to focus on turning their philosophical concepts into 
film.80  Even the threat of censorship, always present, did not dim their enthusiasm to create a 
new course for the Chinese cinema that they envisioned.  Censorship actually worked in the 
opposite role as the Fifth Generation filmmakers used censorship as an element in their work, 
constructing their work carefully to expose the contradictions of the political state within the 
confines of severe restrictions.   “…these filmmakers re-examined their own histories and that of 
their culture and station.  They in effect set out to reinvent China.”81 
Innovative Ambiguity 
Tony Rayns, an English film critic, dates the term “New Chinese Cinema” from April 
12th, 1985, when Yellow Earth opened at a Hong Kong Film Festival.82   Yellow Earth, directed 
by Chen Kaige, was the introductory calling 
card of the Fifth Generation filmmakers, boldly 
serving as the template for their unique style.  
Here is the first example of the most critical 
facet of the Fifth Generation’s philosophy—its 
use of ambiguity.  “Ambiguity was precisely 
the element most strenuously outlawed by Mao’s ‘Yan’an line’ on the arts.”83 Furthermore, in 
the films of the Fifth Generation, “The heroes of the model plays give way to fallible human 
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beings.  Presenting a non-hero is perhaps the most radical divergence from the aesthetics of the 
Cultural Revolution.”84     
 In order to make Yellow Earth, Chen Kaige took his company to the Loess Plateau in 
northwest China, an area of severe rock terrain and caves.  This environment served a dual 
purpose—the vast harsh landscape served as a symbol of the unyielding feudalism that 
dominated the lives of the peasants who worked that land, as well as infusing a subtle hint of 
Mao, who ended his Long March in this geographic region.  The ruthless inflexibility of nature 
was captured by Director Chen’s cinematographer and fellow film student, Zhang Yimou, who 
began his visual fascination with the device of rich color characterizations to highlight the 
supreme hopelessness of the peasant struggle against the stark background.   
Above all other characteristics in Yellow Earth, the almost anthropological naturalness of 
vantage point first makes its appearance as a basis for Fifth Generation narration.  Director Chen 
approaches his characters much like in a documentary style.  Ingeniously, the voice of the film is 
contained in the plaintive and winsome folksongs that are sung by the main characters, Cuiqiao 
and Hanhan, and enhance the plotline around which the whole story centers.  Not only do these 
songs fulfill the soldier’s quest, but they bridge and carry the plot of the movie forward.  The 
haunting songs reveal the inner thoughts and awakening desires for change in Cuiqiao.  As a 
matter of fact, Cuiqiao’s last dialogue is a song cut short, symbolizing her demise. The final all-
male chant for rain around the primal totem figure recalls the timeless dominance of the past. 
The critical politics within Yellow Earth are purposefully wrapped in ambiguity.  Gu 
Qing, the young soldier, is an idealized figure.  He could almost be a caricature taken from the 
model revolutionary ballets in his zestful energy to learn from and assist the most impoverished 
peasants and teach them the value of his new thinking.  His uniform is crisp and clean, and he is 
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tall and young—all in direct contrast to the peasants, old before their time, and dressed in rags.   
However, even with all his new revolutionary thoughts, Gu Qing is not truly independent; he is, 
in fact, an anti-hero.  He is constrained by Party rules and cannot help Cuiqiao achieve 
“liberation” from the old ways.  In fact, Gu Qing himself has no real freedom or capability to act 
on his own and is just a cog of the Party, doing its bidding.  This leaves the audience with an 
uncomfortable feeling, a vague unease that things are not quite right, as the director intended, 
while maintaining overall political neutrality.  It also serves to “…deconstruct…one of the 
Communist Party’s most cherished myths, which holds that Communist ideology spread like 
wildfire through China’s peasant communities in the 1930s—as celebrated in countless 
propaganda movies of the 1950s and 1960s.”85 
In Yellow Earth, Director Chen achieved the perfect rebuttal of censorship that his Fifth 
Generation of filmmakers held as their goal.  He realized this by utilizing specific aesthetic 
means to express a new path for Chinese cinema to follow and develop along.    In doing so, 
“…the Fifth Generation both broke with tradition and maintained it, because they skipped the 
fifties to pick up the humanist philosophy of classical China…”86 
  The reception of Yellow Earth by Chinese critics was comparable to that of the 
Impressionists at the Exposition 1874 in Paris.  The new art form they were presenting was 
immediately the target of a barrage of harsh criticism.  Critics “…found the perspective of the 
director, Chen Kaige, and Zhang Yimou, his cinematographer, to be politically suspect, 
condemning the film for using mass art as a vehicle to “display the backward and ignorant aspect 
of the Chinese peasantry.”87  Director Chen was “…regarded as being too young to understand 
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what Yan’an was all about, and he was accused of distorting the Communist spirit.”88  Even the 
very real peasants that the Fifth Generation filmmakers used in their films were criticized for 
being too realistic: 
The peasant who sings the folk songs in the film is very ugly.  Why did they have to go 
and choose such an actor?  The duty of film is to reflect life as realistically as possible, 
and to retain its true face.  But we must not encourage naturalism, nor let our film-makers 
waste their energies by indulging in voyeurism and the depiction of the remnants of the 
primitive past…”89 
 
All in all, the criticism and subsequent banning of the film in China was based on the fact that no 
one could quite comprehend the new Chinese cinema.  “What are you supposed to do if you’ve 
got a mass art form that the masses don’t understand?”90 
Modes of Resistance 
 
 If, in making Yellow Earth, Chen Kaige utilized an aesthetic mode of resistance against 
the censorship of the Chinese Communist Party, with his use of landscape and folklore, it can be 
argued that his classmates, Tian Zhuangzhuang and Zhang Yimou, employed their own unique 
modes of resistance in developing their film work.  In the case of Director Tian, he chose a 
historical mode of resistance to censorship as exemplified in The Blue Kite.   As he stated “Just 
think about how many historical changes China has undergone in the fifty years I have been 
alive.  The changing environment forces us to continually readjust ourselves.  These changes in 
society and our environment bring out what a person really is, and allow us to have a new 
understanding of human nature.”91   
 Director Tian’s first films, On the Hunting Ground (1985) and Horse Thief (1986), had 
highlighted his interest in non-Han Chinese minorities, which had been part of his down-to-the-
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countryside experience.   He attempted to introduce dialects in these films, testing the 1930s 
edict banning dialects, using Tibetan exclusively, but the Chinese censors rejected it and Tian 
“…had a Mandarin audio track dubbed specifically for the purpose of getting the film past the 
censors.”92  This focus on the “…linguistic violence…” that denied the differences within the 
Chinese nation93 is a recurring theme in his mode of resistance to censorship that Director Tian 
brought as his contribution to the Fifth Generation filmmakers’s philosophy. In these films, Tian 
followed his cultural resistance to the broadest limits: 
The exoticized and even romanticized images of the harsh Tibetan landscape serve as 
vehicles for widening the gulf between the audience and the subjects of the film.  Few in 
China could relate to the open territory, uncrowdedness, lawlessness, and isolation of 
Tibet or Mongolia as they are portrayed in Tian’s films. …[T]he absence of the Han in 
the films, and anything to which they can relate, makes the film alien, and alienating, to 
the viewer.  This is deliberate.94 
 
 With The Blue Kite, Director Tian utilized an epic format to follow the lives of a family 
throughout the Maoist era.  
Like Yellow Earth, the 
story is told in simple, 
straightforward lines.  The 
drama happens to the 
family; the characters are 
not dramatic in themselves.  
Rather they are real people swept up in the political madness that surrounds them.  The power of 
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The Blue Kite lies in this very lack of melodrama, in the omission of reaction.  The criticism of 
the gap between Communist ideology and society is brought into focus by simply recounting the 
everyday struggles to survive of one family. The film draws great power from its use of staging 
set within the confines of the family’s home.  This serves as an unspoken rebuke in its complete 
antithesis to the mandated revolutionary paradigms put forward by Jiang Qing.    History has 
very real consequences for even the most mundane aspects of human existence.  The historical 
events it depicts, such as the Great Leap Forward (1958-1961) and the Four No’s campaign 
(1958-1962)95 are handled with quiet yet powerful realism.  For, although The Blue Kite is far 
more open in its political criticism due to its storyline, its protest still is not overt, using only the 
tool of ambiguity that is the capstone of the early Fifth Generation films.   
 Again the cinematic device of color is richly used against the everyday texture of the 
storyline.  The central image of the beautiful free blue kite makes its appearance at critical stages 
in the central character’s life and helps tie the plotline together.  The use of a child’s song 
mirrors the melancholic refrains of Yellow Earth. Director Tian was not looking to create pathos.  
As he noted, “…I always despised scar literature, I always felt that, to some degree, it was 
simply a new propaganda tool for the post-Cultural Revolution incarnation of the Chinese 
Communist Party.”96  
 Tian had to complete post-production of The Blue Kite in Japan.  It was subsequently 
presented at the Cannes Film Festival in 1993 to great international acclaim and simultaneously 
banned by the Chinese Film Bureau.  The Chinese censors were even more stringent, however, 
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and actually issued a decree “…that Tian…should not be allowed to make any more films.  Nor 
was he to be allowed access to filmmaking equipment and premises.  Two years later his 
production office in the Beijing Film Studio was decorated with a framed copy of the official 
statement revoking the earlier ban, now that Tian…had shown necessary contrition.  Tian’s 
response to being asked about contrition is unprintable.”97 
In Raise the Red Lantern, Zhang Yimou presented his cultural mode of resistance to 
Chinese censorship.  His focus in this film is not to present a particular historical timeframe but 
rather to examine tradition and its associated social mores in the context of the repression of 
authority.  Director Zhang’s films generally focus around a female protagonist.  He claims that 
while this “…fits in with my own sensibilities,” it came about due to the fact that all his films 
were adaptations of novels that happen to use a female perspective.98 99  Of course, his personal 
and professional relationship with the 
leading lady of most of his major films, 
Gong Li, has been a major influence on 
his choice of viewpoint.  
 Through the lens of sheer 
cinematic opulence, gender politics is 
made palpable and exaggerated in every 
aspect in Raise the Red Lantern.  Set 
vaguely sometime in the 1920s, Director Zhang opens his work by focusing in on the young 
university student, Songlian, who speaks to her unseen stepmother and directly faces the camera.  
                                                 
97
 Clark, Reinventing China, 120. 
98Zhang Yimou Interviews: Conversations with Filmmakers Series, Edited by Frances Gateward (Jackson: 
University Press of Mississippi, 2001) 38. 
99
 Raise the Red Lantern is based on a short story, published in 1990, Wives and Concubines by Su Tong.   
Image 3. Scene from Raise the Red Lantern, 
showing the courtyard house where Songlian finds herself 
trapped forever. 
Urban 31 
 
Songlian’s father has died and although she has had one year at university, she feels that she 
might as well marry a rich man because “such is a woman’s fate.”  So, although she shows her 
initial bravado and independence from tradition by walking to her new household rather than 
taking the customary bridal sedan, she conforms to her perceived social providence. Once she 
enters her husband’s household, Songlian is quite literally trapped in a maze as the very grid of 
the exquisite mansion physically foreshadows the labyrinthine emotional relationships she will 
encounter.  This depicts the culture of the sanheyuan or Chinese courtyard house, an example of 
classical Chinese architecture.  Confucian ideology is at the heart of its design in which the space 
is defined in accordance with intricate social rules as “…it is believed that only when families 
are well run, will the state also be well governed.”100  Here Songlian starts to learn that nothing is 
what it seems on the surface; her initial impressions of the wives and concubines she must share 
the rest of her life with are shallow and premature.  Her house and courtyard are exquisite in 
their perfection, and the colors are rich, bold, and sumptuous--in keeping with Zhang Yimou’s 
renowned cinematographic style.  However, the beauty is so flawless and stylized that it is 
almost sterile.  The camera shots too are somehow remote in that they are very formally 
arranged, like painterly compositions rather than real life.  The psychology of this backdrop is 
purposeful.  As the director reveals, “When tragedy is ‘made aesthetic’…, it is all the more 
overpowering.”101  
 Songlian quickly realizes that the rules and traditional customs followed in the household 
are degrading.  For all the richness that surrounds them, the women are mere tokens, totally 
subservient to the male.  Time has stopped in this place, and the social structure binds the women 
together in unity and jealousy with no escape.  Even the sky is glimpsed only sparingly, as the 
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camera is kept level with the characters, furthering the sense of claustrophobia in the 
compound.102  However, it is the red lanterns and the significance of their relentless daily 
positioning that serves as the central symbol of this film.  Zhang Yimou made the story and its 
theme his own by creating and adding the image of the red lanterns into the plot.103  The whole 
world within the repressive walls of the mansion revolves around the daily determination of who 
will be honored by their lord and master by the mounting of the red lanterns.  They are a symbol 
of power and feudal domination, “…at once an image of beauty and a symbol of the patriarchal 
oppressiveness of the system.”104    
 Songlian becomes enmeshed in the customs of the place and succumbs to its sensual 
pleasures such as the exotic foot massage.  However, the in-fighting among the wives and 
concubines reveals the ugliness and deep hatreds that all the richness of the surroundings cannot   
hide.  Unraveling the physical maze takes Songlian to the pavilion where women were killed for 
their disobedience to the males who control their very lives, and leads to the realization that she 
is trapped in the inescapable psychological maze that society has cast her into.  Because she is 
naïve in many respects, this culminates in her lying to her husband that she is pregnant.  It is the 
beginning of her breakdown and her tragedy. The casting out of the lanterns upon the unfurling 
of her lie is horrifically graphic, with all the color and light sucked out of her life.  It is symbolic 
death and every bit as profound.  When she sees that she is directly responsible for the death of 
her maid as well as her fellow concubine, her mind collapses.  And yet the ritual of the red 
lanterns continues inexorably as a new concubine takes the place vacated by the murdered 
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concubine, and Songlian drifts madly through the rest of her days.   The juggernaut of culture has 
crushed free will and independence.   
 While the screenplay of Raise the Red Lantern had been approved by the Chinese 
censors, the actual film was banned from Chinese cinemas and only released to an international 
audience.  However, it has served as a lightening rod around which Chinese critics have brought 
together all their charges against the Fifth Generation filmmakers.   This negative reaction had its 
origin in the fact that Director Zhang’s previous film, Judou, won an Academy Award 
nomination in 1991, and “…fifth-generation filmmaking seemed to have achieved a signal 
honor.”105   But senior film censors had been extremely distressed as they understood this 
nomination quite differently, seeing such an award uprooting their ban on releasing the film in 
China.  “The Chinese authorities’ ignorance of the effect that their interference might have in 
galvanizing foreign opinion in defence of the film was a product of their long practice of 
ignoring public opinion in their own country….”106  This began the discrediting of the Fifth 
Generation films within their own country, an attack quite distinct from mere censorship.   
Changing Worlds: Post-socialist Cinemas 
 
 The particular period that produced the signature films that introduced the Fifth 
Generation filmmakers was a mirror of the political changes occurring within post-Mao China.  
As a Communist nation “…after forty years of socialism, the people of mainland China …[had] 
more in common with the people in the former Soviet Union, Bulgaria, and Hungary than they 
…[had] with the people in Taiwan.”107  Other Communist countries were also in the throes of 
experiencing a new path due to shifting political values with the fall of the Iron Curtain and 
glasnost.  As a result, the failure of socialism has become increasingly the subject of modern 
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cinema in all Communist countries.  Films such as Polish film director Andrzej Wajda’s Man of 
Marble (1977) and Man of Iron (1981) exemplify the tone of Eastern European cinema of the 
period.108  “Their purpose is not to salvage socialism by advocating reform, but rather to 
demonstrate that traditional socialist societies are afflicted with various and deeply rooted 
terminal infirmities.”109   
Captives of Censorship 
For the Fifth Generation filmmakers, the initial disapproval of their new cinema style by 
Chinese critics had been counterbalanced by their acclaim in international circles.  “It is worth 
noting that at no stage in its history has Fifth Generation cinema ever been positively endorsed in 
China.  In terms of both cultural position and film style, it has always been marginalized and 
never recognized as a legitimate discourse or admitted to mainstream culture.110  Their rise to 
fame in the West led to increasing rumblings against their work by national critics.  In speaking 
of their films, such phrases would be applied to them as: “…the ‘superficial pretense’ 
consciously pursued by directors like Zhang Yimou,”111 with Director Zhang  “…humorously 
given the nickname dejiangzhuanyehu, or “the awards expert.”112  Even more searing critiques 
indicted their films, pointing to the “…self-Orientalizing male elite narrative…gory, cruel, and 
charming stories about women…[that] win them a ticket ‘to the world.’ Or the attention of the 
West.”113 
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History was rapidly changing against the backdrop of their new Chinese cinema.  The 
1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre had profoundly altered the course of Chinese history.    Teng 
Jinxian became the new head of the Film Bureau under the Ministry of Radio, Film and 
Television in mid-1990, heralding a return to the 1950’s style of political propaganda films.114  
“Teng charged that filmmakers are guilty of “national nihilism” and “blindly worship Western 
film theory and artistic genres….[condemning] filmmakers …interested in the subject of human 
nature.”115  
Economic changes came into play as well.  Unions used to buy large blocks of movie 
tickets for their workers, basically subsidizing both good and bad films by ensuring an audience.  
But when the economy declined, these sales declined from 70 percent in the1980s to 20 percent 
in 1998.116 
This was also the time in which the state film industry crumpled like the proverbial paper 
tiger.  When Chen and his colleagues started their careers, money was not something to 
be worried about.  Their films, made with extravagant sets, often in remote locations, 
were solidly backed by the official studios, however unsuccessful they were financially.  
The situation could not last.  Trapped in a vicious cycle of bad films, bad politics, and 
bad management, the big studios were going bankrupt in all but name.  By the time the 
state monopoly started to loosen its grip over film markets, the audience for local movies 
had dropped off.117 
 
Consumerism was providing the people with expanded media choices.   Cable TV and 
special shows featuring the latest releases from Hong Kong and Hollywood became the public’s 
choice.  “On those occasions when only mainland-made movies were available, some exhibitors 
took to shutting down the theater completely, since they could only expect to lose money.118 
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The international awards that had propelled the Fifth Generation filmmakers to 
recognition now caused them to be caught up in a vortex.    They had the advantage of their 
reputations to obtain foreign funding for their films.  However, “…the situation added new 
pressures to win international prizes:  on top of what they did for the national psyche, they 
provided calculable marketing advantages, a seal of commercial viability.”119  Yet when the 
directors brought forward films, such as Director Zhang’s Hero or Director Chen’s The Promise, 
using the scale and equaling the caliber of Hollywood commercial ventures,  “The Fifth 
Generation, once heralded as brilliant enfants terribles, were now to be unmasked as a group of 
overrated, callow, and pretentious self-promoters.”120  Caught up in a dual dilemma, even the 
issue of censorship has come under scrutiny, creating a situation in which “…some overseas 
distributors…ask if they could claim a given film is ‘banned’ in mainland China as a promotion 
strategy even though the film has obtained permits from censors.”121 122  
The response of the Fifth Generation filmmakers is to continue their experiments with 
films.  Director Zhang “…has consistently insisted since the 1980s that, despite his international 
success, his target audience in all his films is Chinese” and, in fact, he has never learned English 
and retains his home in Beijing.123  The Fifth Generation filmmakers earned their reputations by 
their manipulation of censorship, taking bold steps forward to advance Chinese cinema, and 
establishing a unique position in cinema.  Yet, when they should have been able to experiment 
further, the Fifth Generation filmmakers find themselves trapped in their own renown, subject as 
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“…prophet[s]…[who are] not without honor save in…[their] own country and in …[their] own 
house”  to national criticism disavowing their accomplishments.124  
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Appendix of Images 
Image 1. of Yellow Earth, found through Google in an online blog by Francis Cruz.  Lessons 
from the School of Inattention:  Oggs’ Movie Thoughts, November 11, 2007.  
http://oggsmoggs.blogspot.com/2007/11/yellow-earth-1984.html. 
 
Image 2. of Raise the Red Lantern, found through Google in an online blog by mkp. The Film 
Sufi: Devoted to Discussion of Film Expression, November 5, 2009. 
http://filmsufi.blogspot.com/2009/11/raise-red-lantern-zhang-yimou-1991.html. 
 
Image 3. of The Blue Kite, found through Google in an online blog by Ike Cinecult.  February 
17, 2010. 
http://cinemaurum.wordpress.com/2010/02/17/%e8%93%9d%e9%a3%8e%e7%ad%9d-
1993/. 
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